As with the other presidential elections from this decade, the 2008 election was followed by considerable speculation as to how new efforts to mobilize voters affected the eventual outcome. Although the conventional wisdom implies that "Democrats benefit from higher turnout," previous research in political science demonstrates that such a conclusion applies to actual election results inconsistently. In this paper, we outline the difficulties involved with assessing turnout effects within a particular election and proceed to test the hypothesis that the Obama campaign benefited from higher turnout using three different methods. The evidence suggests that the Obama campaign benefited substantially from voter turnout, particularly in comparison to the Kerry campaign in 2004, yet they also were successful in changing the minds of already mobilized voters.
Introduction
Among the many notable traits of the 2008 presidential election, one of the most discussed concerned the potential impact of increased voter turnout on the election. In both 2000 and 2004, representatives from all political walks devoted new attention to mobilizing voters to take advantage of technological innovation and changes in fundraising. In the 2000 election, these efforts were largely driven by the influx of soft money funds to political parties (Holbrook and McClurg 2005) . These efforts were greatly extended in the next presidential election by groups like America Coming
Together and the much discussed 72-Hour Task Force assembled by the Republican Party to bring conservative voters to the polls through phone calls and emails.
Given the significant rise in voter eligible turnout in the United States to 50% and With all the attention parties and interest groups devoted to producing turnout in the past few elections, it would be easy to assume that these efforts and the concomitant fluctuations in turnout played an integral part in determining which candidate prevailed.
To be sure, this kind of claim was made frequently in the wake of the Obama victory.
The PBS headline on election night declared that Obama's presidential win was "fueled by huge turnout" 2 , and news organizations noted Obama's intense campaigning in the week before the election in Virginia, North Carolina, and Indiana and high turnout in these states as explanations for his victories, implying a connection between the two.
Such assertions are reminiscent of long standing conventional wisdoms about turnout which imply that when turnout is "high" that Democrats do "better." Yet an examination of political science scholarship provides mixed evidence in support of this claim. Studies across a wide variety of legislative (DeNardo 1980) , state (Nagel and McNulty 1996) , and presidential (Radcliff 1994 ) elections provide what can at best be construed as inconsistent evidence for the conventional wisdom. For instance, DeNardo turnout, and socioeconomic factors, and that it is inter-electoral fluctuations that produce differential turnout benefit effects.
Drawing on insights from prior research, this paper tests the claim that the Obama victory was driven by turnout. We begin our examination by discussing the analytic difficulties involved in trying to determine the political consequences of voter turnout within any single election. Acknowledging the drawbacks of any particular approach, we outline three different methods for evaluating the effects of turnout in the 2008 election.
Though the final estimates are lacking in precision, the consistency of our results across methods and models implies that in the context of this election, Democratic efforts at voter mobilization did in fact contribute to Obama's victory. However, Obama's victory was not only due to the effects of mobilization on turnout; changes in voter choice played a role as well. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of this in light of theories about and empirical evaluations of the effects of mobilization.
What Constitutes a Turnout Effect?
The principal methodological problem confronting our study is how to measure a turnout effect. At the heart of the conventional wisdom is the plausibility of a key Yet there is good reason to question the conventional wisdom. DeNardo (1986 DeNardo ( , 1980 shows that while it may be true that there is more latent, un-mobilized support for Democrats, the effects of this group on an election outcome depend upon their loyalty. Comparing variation within a single election carries with it similar strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, each of the units under examination (e.g., counties) is comparable in the sense that the voters are making decisions in the same national electoral context. As such, an intra-electoral study is the mirror image of inter-electoral study in that the contextual sources of variability are easily controlled. But on the other hand, the other sources of variability in both turnout and voting become more difficult to pin down. To be sure, we can to some degree control for these by including demographic control variables at the aggregate level (e.g., median income). However, doing so with confidence requires the fairly strong assumption that the model is accurately specified in the cross-section and that the parameters that describe the relationship between the control variables, turnout, and voting remain constant across time.
Implications for Understanding the 2008 Presidential Election
As the previous section makes clear, unraveling the political consequences of voter turnout within a single election is a challenging task. And, unfortunately, the most common methods used for this task all come up short on some standard of evaluation.
Thus, we will examine the 2008 presidential election by combining careful reasoning with three methodological approaches. While this kind of examination will not yield precise estimates of causal effects, it has the advantage of beginning to provide boundary estimates of the relationship between turnout and voting under different assumptions, thereby helping us gather an overall understanding of the role of turnout in 2008.
A Cross-County Analysis. Our first approach will be to examine the correlation between turnout and voting among counties within the 2008 election alone. Specifically, we will use an approach outlined by McClurg (N.d) to decompose voter turnout into two different components: 1) structural and 2) mobilization. The first of these is the level of turnout predicted by a county's demographic socioeconomic attributes, which he argues reflects the "structural bias" in turnout that naturally benefits Republicans, the party that is on average more responsive to high status voters (Bartels 2000) . The second attribute is the deviation from actual turnout and the structural component, thus representing the proportion of voter turnout that is "abnormal" relative to a county's demographic makeup. In his analysis of the 2004 election, McClurg suggests that this is the part of the turnout function which can account for most intra-electoral change and thereby shed light on the unique impact of turnout across electoral jurisdictions in a single election.
Although this method cannot entirely address questions about DeNardo's two parameters, we argue that the structural component should capture the average loyalty rate of persistent voters across jurisdictions while the mobilization component should measure the average loyalty rate of peripheral voters.
Our hypotheses for this test are straightforward. We expect that the effect of structural turnout on county-level voting patterns should benefit Republicans, suggesting they do better than Democrats in those areas where turnout should be high because of the connection between participation and socioeconomic status. For the mobilization component, we expect a positive effect will benefit Democrats, as it contributed to support for Obama. If it is negative, then it implies that Republicans did better in areas with higher-than-expected turnout and that Obama was hurt by spikes in turnout.
A Cross-Electoral Jurisdictional Approach. Our second approach will be to examine changes in the correlation between voter turnout and election returns in U. Democrats is less under conditions of full turnout, it would imply that they were advantaged by voter mobilization and that shifts in voter choice had less of an impact on the final outcome. This interpretation is complicated if we consider previous research, which suggests that in nearly every election Democrats would do better under conditions of full turnout. This would imply that Democrats doing better might still indicate a mobilization effect, though one that is difficult to identify in practice.
Mobilization from a Cross-Sectional Perspective: A Cross-County Analysis
To begin, we examine turnout from the perspective of variation within our election of main interest: 2008. The goal here is to parse county turnout into twodifferent factors: structural and mobilization. Structural turnout is the predicted level of voter turnout in a county given its socioeconomic characteristics, while the mobilization component is the deviation between real turnout and its structural component. The logic of this definition is partly based on the notion that the effects of turnout which stem from its relationship with education and income should not be confused with the effects of unusually high or low turnout that are ground in election-specific factors. As noted, this approach requires some relatively strong assumptions about the counterfactuals to which we make comparisons, but has the advantage of controlling for electoral context. 5 Third, using this measure of turnout gives us a measure that 4 For our purposes, the difference between using VEP and VAP creates a likely measurement error that would inflate the size of the turnout effect on the Democratic vote by exaggerating differences between low and high turnout counties. To address this problem, we estimated two alternative specifications. First, we re-estimated our models with state-level demographic variables to compare the coefficients using VAP and VEP measures. Second, we added a measure of foreign-born population in each county to correct to some degree for the effect of non-eligible immigrants on VAP. In each of these re-estimations, the small differences in coefficients are consistent with our expectations regarding measurement error, yet they still support the conclusions we draw from the existing models. How will these results change when we separate turnout into its separate components?
underestimating a mobilization effect. However, as the state is a different unit of analysis that it is subject to a form of aggregation bias, we only feel confident suggesting that whatever the nature of the county-level measure bias, it does not seem to be the driving force behind our estimates. 6 We account for this by re-estimating each of our models after trimming 5% from the top and bottom of the turnout distribution. In each case, the estimates are consistent with discussion in the text. 7 These models were also estimated with ordinary least squares regression with a separate variable for every state, clustering standard errors within states, and weighing the results by county voting age population. The estimate of turnout influence is not appreciably different at 0.215 with a t-value of 5.14. How important is mobilization in the scheme of the overarching election? For every 10% points higher turnout is than we would expect given the demographic makeup of a county, we find that the Democratic share of the two-party vote increases by 1%. This is not enough evidence to suggest that this was the centerpiece of the Obama victory, particularly when we consider that roughly 80% of the counties had a mobilization score between -10% and 10%. Among those counties where the mobilization score is greater than 10%, only nine had a Democratic vote share that was between 50% and 51%. The influence of voter turnout benefited the Democrats, but was certainly not the deciding factor.
A second question to consider is how these effects compare with preceding elections. Though we consider the question of inter-election comparison more completely below, we try to determine the comparability of the structural and mobilization components of turnout by comparing them for the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. This effort is reported in Figure 1 and Table 2 . In Figure 1, 
Assessing Mobilization in Comparison to 2004: A Cross-Electoral Approach
Our next approach to studying mobilization is to examine how differences in turnout from 2004 to 2008 are related to change in the Democratic vote between those elections. In the 3000-plus counties in the United States, there was notable change in the voting behavior of Americans, ranging from a decline of 20% for Democrats in Coal County, OK, to an increase of 18.5% in Clifton Forge City, VA. Similar variability is evident in voter turnout. Lake County, TN, experienced a decline of nearly 38% in turnout by our measure, while Clifton Forge City experienced an increase of nearly 38%.
More generally, there is an average increase in both variables across all counties (2% for Democratic vote, 1% for turnout) with significant variability. We gain a greater understanding of these results by comparing them to the second column of Table 3 with substantial demographic shifts, often the target of presidential campaigning, may drive some of the changes in turnout. To account for this problem, we consider two alternative data sources. First, we estimate our models using state-level data. Though the small-n in this data source renders the produced coefficients imprecise, the same pattern emerges in these results: Obama received more votes but not enough votes to influence the outcome.
Second, we compare state-level information from the American Community Survey (ACS), which replicates much of the information in the 2000 census, to our statelevel census estimates. The pair-wise correlation coefficient for each variable from the ACS was over .90 for each variable from the census. These two comparisons suggest that, at least at the state level, population dynamics over the eight years from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] do not change the nature of jurisdictions dramatically. While this is undoubtedly less true at the county level because it is a lower-level unit of aggregation, we believe this suggests the problem of demographic change is not significantly so severe as to alter the results of our analysis.
In the final analysis these effects are mild. Roughly one-quarter of all U.S.
counties had an increase in turnout that was sufficient for increasing the Democratic share of the two-party vote by one-percent. Those counties experienced an average change in Democratic vote share of 4%, with the overall vote share averaging just 43.5%.
Indeed, only 13 counties in the data set experienced an increase in turnout that was 5% or greater where the Democratic % of the two party vote was between 0% and 1%.
Although some of these were in battleground states, it does not seem a stretch to conclude that while Obama benefited from the surge in turnout, it was not the source of his Electoral College victory. 9 This effect is consistent with the results of the first section above.
Assessing Mobilization Effects with Simulations: The Full Turnout Method
Finally, we compare our conclusions drawn from the first two methods above to a replication of the method of simulating election results assuming conditions of full turnout used by Citrin, Schickler, and Sides (2003) . The goal of these authors was to also included partisan and religious variables which were not available to Citrin, et al. (2003) , who explain that they would have incorporated partisanship or ideology had the relevant variables been included in the CPS data. 11 As with any survey of voter turnout, there was a 15.4% incidence of over-reporting on the part of respondents in the ANES data. While this is of course problematic, it is not overly different than the 13% incidence of over-reporting in the data analyzed by Citrin, et al. (2003) . They argue, for a variety of reasons, that over-reporting does not significantly "skew" the results reported in their study (78). Table 4 reports the results of the logit equations predicting an individual-level vote for Obama in the 2008 election. Model 1 contains the same independent variables as employed by Citrin, et al. (2003) while Model 2 adds partisanship and religious conservatism. 12 The data for both models were weighted according to the sample 10 Because this is an advance release of the ANES study, the survey documentation recommends labeling the conclusions reached by analysis of its data as "tentative, preliminary, or subject to change." 11 It is important to note that the major difference between our estimation of the Citron et al (2003) model is we cannot break the results down to the state level because we are using ANES data. This makes our estimation a sample of the nation rather than an estimation of effects on the Electoral College tally. 12 The partisanship variables are dummy variables for self-identified Democratic and Republican partisanship. The religious conservatism measure is a dummy variable coded "1" if the respondent reports that they believe that the Bible is the word of God and should be interpreted literally. This variable was added because previous research has shown that religion is playing an increasingly powerful role in determining individuallevel vote choice in the U.S., especially at the national level (see Green 2007, e.g.) . The Biblical literalism question is used as a proxy for the modernist-traditionalist split in American religion, which has shown to be a more powerful predictor of vote choice than weighting variables included in the ANES dataset. Table 5 then reports the predicted vote for Obama among non-voters using the logit coefficients from both models.
13 <Table 4 and Table 5 about here> To calculate the election results of full turnout under each circumstance (Models 1
and 2), we can apply the results from Table 4 to Citrin, Schickler, and Sides's (2003) simulation equation How does this 7-point gap compare to the difference between actual and simulated outcomes in previous elections? This question is somewhat tricky to answer, in no small part due to the fact that we have simulated national -rather than stateoutcomes here. Nevertheless, we turn to Martinez and Gill's (2005) examination of either religious affiliation or frequency of church attendance (see Wuthnow 1998) .
Replications of the estimations here without Biblical literalism included yield a slightly higher (about one percent) vote share for Obama. 13 The logit equation being: P(vote Democratic) = exp(Xβ)/1+exp(Xβ). Xβ is the constant plus the sum of each variable multiplied by its coefficient. 14 President Obama received 52.9% of the overall vote, including minor party candidates. While this data is consistent with that hypothesis, it is nevertheless important to recognize its limitations as a test of the turnout hypothesis in 2008. At a minimum, the evidence may simply reflect a decline in the pro-Democrat bias of abstainers. This is consistent with the longer-term evidence that Martinez and Gill provide in their article.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our intention in this paper is to test the hypothesized relationship between turnout and Obama's victory in the analysis of the 2008 election. We do so with a particular eye to the persistent problem in political science research of how to measure the effect of changes in turnout on elections. Past studies of turnout's effect on election outcomes consistently grapple with the problem of separating increased turnout effects from changes in voter choice among those who turn out, and with the additional problem of extracting these effects from outcomes that in part are attributable to election-specific Table entries are logit coefficients with their associated levels of significance. The dependent variable is coded "1" if the respondent voted for Obama and "0" for McCain.
The excluded categories are: age (under 30); income(less than $15,000); education (no high school degree); race (white); non-union; marital status (anything other than married); religion (Bible is not the word of God and/or should not be interpreted literally); partisanship (Independent).
Source: 2008 ANES Time Series Study *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; # p < .10 (two-tailed). 
